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A CRITICAL ASESSMENT OF CENTRAL AGENCY MOTIVES IN 
DANISH PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Lotte Jensen 
Introduction 
This article explores the question why a relatively „healthy“ governance system like 
Denmark embarks on and continually develops NPM inspired public sector reforms. 
Expanding Roberts' categorization of problems as „simple“, „complex“ and „wicked“, 
the article interprets Hood's paradox of the „malade imaginaire“ as „solution driven 
problems“ in strong economies. 
It is argued that accountability problems pervade western democracies, but that 
accountability itself remains a contested concept. NPM provides a battery of fiscal 
accountability solutions that frame the understanding of the nature of late modern 
governance problems and enhance the position of actors who are able to develop, 
institutionalize and legitimize fiscal accountability mechanisms as the most overarching 
and fundamental in a democratic governance system. The past 20 years of Danish public 
sector reform illustrate how the Danish Ministry of Finance has succeeded with 
normatively constructing and institutionally underpinning fiscal accountability as a 
prime source of democratic accountability and by the same token enhance its position in 
the continual governance game in the Danish polity.  
Public Sector Reform in Denmark – Whose Project? 
In his keynote speech at the International Public Management Network conference in 
Sydney (Hood, 2000), Hood addressed three apparent paradoxes in the way NPM 
inspired reforms have or have not proliferated in the western world. One of those 
paradoxes was termed the „malade imaginaire“ paradox: it seemed to be the „healthiest“ 
patients (countries) who had visited the NPM hospital most eagerly and taken the 
doctors prescriptions most seriously. This apparent paradox was, along with two others, 
explained by type of „public service bargain“ (PBS) between politicians and senior 
public servants. When politicians anticipated a better bargain (lower agency or 
uncertainty costs - or alternatively an increase in the senior bureaucrats ' commitment to 
politicians' policy programs) they would ceteris paribus opt for reform strategies even 
in administratively „healthy“ systems. In the introduction to the lecture Hood made the 
point that:  
In a fuller analysis the preferences of public servants over bureaucratic structures 
and control systems would need to be given equal attention since attempts at 
bureau shaping or resistance to more rigorous control frameworks seem to be 
common in the politics of public-service managerialism. (Hood, 2000: 15; see 
also Dunleavy, 1991)  
This point is well taken for the case of Danish public sector reform. In Denmark, 
administrative politics is hardly seen as high politics. In fact – as Christensen (1994) 
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points out – it is hard to sustain political interest in the matter over any longer period of 
time. Also, the assumption of macho politicians able and keen to steer the public sector 
should be treated as a hypothesis rather than a fact. It is therefore worthwhile exploring 
some alternative reasons as to why Denmark, which belongs to the countries that were 
„relatively honest and effective“ in the first place has been „first in line“ (Hood, 2000: 
19) with and continues to develop administrative reforms inspired by prescriptions from 
the NPM drawer. First, it is useful to clarify what is meant by NPM in this context. 
What is meant by NPM? 
It has been widely recognized that NPM is an umbrella label or indeed a 'shopping 
basket' (Pollitt, 1995) containing a variety of public sector reform elements so diverse 
that academics have been tempted to conclude that if NPM is everything - maybe it is 
nothing, and as a minimum the expression of NPM is so dependent of national 
governmental traditions and administrative cultures that it is pointless to talk about a 
general global phenomenon (Rhodes, 1999). However, varied as it may be, a „reform 
agenda“ discursively underpinned by the OECD has floated around and lent inspiration 
and conceptualization to national reform movements in the western world (Naschold, 
1995). The NPM agenda is summarized by Pollitt (1995: 134) as: Cost cutting, dis-
aggregation, decentralization, purchaser-provider splits, introduction of markets or quasi 
markets, performance measurement, performance related pay and increased service 
quality. Although Denmark can never be accused of being excessive, the Danish reform 
„basket“ contains elements of - at least – attempts to: 
1. Decrease public involvement (corporatization of public enterprises, sale of 
state assets and contracting out) and spending (continual attempts to 
modernize budget systems) 
2. Restructure the public sector more principal-agent oriented manners (budget 
frame steering, agency contracts, individual contracts and enterprise 
accounts) 
3. Introduce performance measurement at both individual and institutional levels 
to reassure effective use of public funds, e.g., bench marking, enterprise 
accounts, knowledge accounts, performance related pay systems. (For a 
comprehensive account of public sector reform trends, see Greve and Jensen, 
1999; Jones and Thompson, 1999). 
In this article, what is referred to as "NPM-inspired reforms" will cover items 2 and 3 in 
the list above - reform initiatives that aim at enhanced economic steering capacity and 
enhanced efficiency. The current situation in Denmark is summarized broadly by the 
permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance:  
In the eighties we established capable economic steering mechanisms. The 
nineties became the decade where 'target- and performance' -steering was put on 
track. The task for the coming decade is to get still more employees in still larger 
parts of the public sector to make sense of target- and performance steering. 
(Eldrup, 1999: 32) 
It is hence safe to conclude that although Denmark has been nowhere near as radical as 
for example New Zealand, Britain or Victoria a battery of NPM inspired concepts have 
been employed and continue to be developed and articulated.  
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Problems seeking Solutions – Solutions looking for Problems? 
Hood (2000) points out that the Scandinavian countries were amongst „the first in line“ 
when it comes to NPM inspired reform, in spite of the fact that they are all relatively 
efficient and honest. In the terminology Denmark can therefore be seen as a case of 
„malade imaginaire“. Why is this so? What problems do those reform solutions 
address? 
Roberts, in her presentation at the Sydney conference (see Roberts in this volume) 
distinguished between three types of „problems“ depending on whether the problem 
definition and the solution were contested. Defined problems with defined solutions 
were termed „simple problems“; defined problems with contested solutions were termed 
„complex problems“ and, finally, the delicate situation where both problem definition 
and solution were contested was termed „wicked problems“. Following the political 
scientist predilection for two-by-two tables, we miss a fourth category, namely the 
situation with a defined solution, but where the problem definition is not obvious or 
recognized: „Consider, for example solution-driven problem solving. Although there 
seems to be ample evidence that when performance fail to meet aspirations, institutions 
search for new solutions, changes often seem to be driven less by problems than by 
solutions.“ (March and Olsen, 1989:62) In this vein we can term the fourth category of 
problems „solution driven“ to capture the situation where stake holders in given 
solutions look for opportunities to define problems to attach them to. The types of 
problems are shown in table 1.  
Table 1: Types of Problems 
The problem/solution mix Defined Problem Contested Problem 
Defined Solution 1. Simple 4. Solution-driven 
Contested Solution 2. Complex 3. Wicked 
Sources: Roberts (2000), March and Olsen (1989)  
This observation introduces another possible interpretation of the 'malade imaginaire' 
paradox. Public sector reforms are political interventions that create winners and losers, 
enhance the power of some players and weaken the power of others. It is therefore a 
continual battlefield in its own right. It should be considered that certain elements of the 
NPM inspired reform agenda (solutions) may have strong national stake holders, not 
only (albeit also) because they may improve public sector performance, legitimacy and 
accountability. But also because their employment enhances their power position in the 
total system in the same go.  
Consequently, political-administrative systems are not only „susceptible“ (as Hood 
expressed it) to reform „pressures „ from the international advocacy coalition of the 
OECD. Systems may as well be „inhabited“ by actors who see a point in actively 
adopting certain reform solutions for a variety of reasons, one of which can be that those 
solutions contribute to defining the public sector problem we face in a way that favors 
their interests. I argue that this is among the things that the Danish Ministry of Finance 
has successfully managed to do. We will now turn to the issue of defining „the public 
sector problem“. 
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Defining „the public sector problem“ 
„By the mid 1980s, it became clear that there was a remarkable degree of consensus 
among the political leadership of various countries about what was wrong about the 
civil service.“ (Peters and Savoie, 1994:419) The macho version of this consensus fell 
into Roberts' category of „simple“, concerning both the boundaries and the structure of 
the public sector. The problems were viewed as:  
1. The public sector is too encompassing, and  
2. It builds on an input logic, which defeats rather than exploits the „natural“ 
incentive structures within human beings.  
Similarly, the solutions were viewed as  
1. Roll back the boundaries of the public sector, and  
2. Reshape its internal mechanisms in accordance with the utility maximizing 
animals that inhabit it.  
Simplicity has its appeal and the reforms of Victoria (Hughes and O'Neill, 2000) and 
New Zealand (Boston et al., 1996) to varying degrees illustrate that this is not just a 
caricature, but live guidelines for administrative reform. Certainly, for the Danish case, 
the reform initiatives in the early 1980´s were prompted by considerable economic 
deficits, as expressed by the minister of Finance in a famous TV speech in 1979:  
Some people say that we are driving at the edge of the abyss. We're not, but we're 
heading towards it…and when I talk about the abyss, I refer to a situation where - 
directly or indirectly - our economic policy becomes dictated form elsewhere' 
(Østergaard,1998: 292).  
The overspending problem was easily defined. „Solutions“ – that is reform programs - 
had to address that problem. In year 2000, we are envisaging a different situation: „A 
key element in the medium term strategy continues to be maintaining a significant 
public sector surplus„ (Ministry of Finance 2000:1). What used to be the simple 
problem is no longer so. However, as we shall see, solutions that address economic 
steering problems continually multiply and proliferate.  
 Over the past decade 'simplicity' in Roberts' sense has blurred somewhat even in the 
most rigorous reform experiments. For example, it is uncertain what the reform effects 
are, if indeed they can be measured. (Boston, 2000; Gregory, 2000) Countries that adopt 
a more pragmatic stance towards reform have come up with a variety of different 
solutions, so there is no longer such a thing as „the best country.“ (Wolf, 2000a) Also, it 
is no surprise that administrative reform has its opponents and deprived groups will 
always try to combat and change the reform agenda (Hughes and O'Neill, 2000). In 
sum, there have been widespread controversies both in academia and practice about the 
transplantation of the compelling simplicity of economic theory to the politico-
administrative domain.  
Al Gore's neat catch phrase of „a government that works better and costs less“ (Gore, 
1993) has come to mean something much more indeterminate because one thing is cost 
cutting but what does „work better“ entail? The public sector „problem“ has begun to 
seem not only „complex“ in Roberts' terminology, but even „wicked „ as interpretations 
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of the nature of the actual governance problems multiply. An influential strand in Public 
Administration (See for example Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 1993) has highlighted the 
fact that public sector organizations are increasingly complex systems that link 
interdependent organized actors within and across national boundaries, policy areas and 
public, private and voluntary sectors. The central governance systems are seen as 
„hollowed out“ (Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes, 1997) because competence is given over to 
supranational bodies (in Europe, notably the EU) or devolved to de-central entities, be it 
the local authorities, state agencies, state owned or voluntary bodies. Democratic 
decisions thus „explode“ into confetti as they are made in a multitude of forums, and yet 
those forums „implode“ and become difficult to access and overview. (Pedersen, 1994). 
In such complex systems, there is no one „command bunker“ from where commands 
are hierarchically sprinkled out over a deferring environment. Some authors refer to this 
as „the center-less society“ others as „polycentrism“ (Andersen, 1995: 91). Societal 
governance is a multi-actor, multi-level game in which actors must define themselves, 
the problems and the solutions together in ever permuting coalitions to accommodate 
and try to partly shape and steer the social, technical and physical environment (Mayntz, 
1997; Kooiman,1997; Dunsire,1997). Late modern governance thus may be viewed as a 
„wicked“ activity.  
There is a considerable gap between this "wickedness" and the general increasing 
human aspirations to control (Mayntz, 1997:12), as well as the quest for accountability 
built into the parliamentary chain of governance that normatively frames western 
democracies:  
We can all probably agree that our societies are no longer characterized by simple 
and transparent structures. And we all realize that modern political and 
administrative institutions are extremely complex. At the same time, however, 
most of us subscribe to the classical principles of political institution building. 
(Wolf, 1999: 1) 
The gap has two distinct, but simultaneous consequences. First, it poses new challenges 
to any actor who aspires to control others. As fixed hierarchies erode, power becomes 
less a matter of position, more a matter of successful game playing. (Jensen, 2000). 
Second, the gap mentally accentuates the urge to make the world „steer-able“, to hold 
somebody to account for the multiple decisions that form our lives. There is a pressure 
to get to grips with development in society. Public sector reform is a continual 
contribution to the reassurance of faith in modern democratic systems based on human 
agency, will and choice: „Efforts at administrative reform, like other political efforts, 
express - and thereby confirm- a fundamental confidence in the possibility of directing 
and controlling human existence, or, more specifically, the government“ (March and 
Olsen, 1989:91). It is an attempt to give the parliamentary chain of governance more 
than just symbolic meaning by institutionalizing structures through which it - against all 
odds - makes sense to place responsibility on the shoulders of actors who are held 
accountable by the electorate. Therefore, the normative thrust of much public sector 
reform is that the aim is to improve accountability:  
Trust in government is what makes democratic government effective. Without 
trust no living democracy and no real citizenship, without trust no compliance 
with rules and regulations and no willingness to pay taxes, without trust no civil 
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service of high standards and without accountability no trust in 
government.'(Wolf, 1999: 3) 
What does Accountability mean? 
Unfortunately, accountability is in itself a contested concept, although is it possible to 
generically define it as the "…ability to answer and respond when asked." (Wolf: 1999: 
9). How should the accountability problem be defined? Who is supposed to give 
accounts to whom and for what? Wolf (1999:10) suggests five dimensions of 
accountability: Legal: To what extent do actors comply with normative prescriptions? 
Fiscal: To what extent do actors spend public money the most effective way? 
Performance: To what extent do actors meet the goals articulated by elected politicians 
and the expectations that they have created in the public domain? Democratic: To what 
extent do actors respect democratic values and enhance democratic processes? Ethic: To 
what extent do actors behave in accordance with codes of ethics and general moral 
standards? 
Each dimension has distinct normative foundations and technical or/and political 
prerequisites. The normative argument for legal accountability is closely related to the 
Rechtsstaat tradition and the core idea that action taken must be grounded in legislation 
which must not be retrospective, must be generalizable and allow citizens to calculate 
the effects of their actions and their rights vis a vis the state. The technical prerequisites 
for legal accountability are that there are accurate regulations to follow. This 
prerequisite increasingly breaks down in late modern governance because of the need 
for flexibility, for judgments made by professionals and because the scope of regulation 
is now so far ranging that it is down right impossible to legally pin down all regulations 
(Rothstein, 1997). 
Compared to legal accountability the normative argument for fiscal accountability lacks 
formality. It has to be continually constructed. That generally takes to forms. One is the 
need to „make ends meet“ as in a normal household budget. The other is the prospect 
that it is possible to „make the cake bigger“ so there is a bigger welfare slice to 
everybody. The technical prerequisites for budget control (necessary for the first reason) 
are multiple: information about spending patterns has to be available, interpretable and 
comparable. Structural economic politics (which is necessary for the second reason) 
require that political programs in a variety of sub-areas (e.g. tax, labor market, 
infrastructure) are fiscally „vetted“ and coordinated. This - in turn – requires a political 
platform from where this can happen. 
As for political performance accountability the whole idea that elected politicians are 
held accountable for policy outputs and civil service performance lies at the heart of the 
image of parliamentary democracy. The prerequisites for policy- and performance 
accountability is, in short, a compliant civil service, otherwise the parliamentary system 
looses its normative meaning and politicians are held accountable for actions and 
decisions they are not in control of. The technical prerequisite for performance 
accountability is that politicians know the details of policy implementation, the output 
of public sector organizations and the final outcome of their decisions.  
The underlying normative idea of democratic accountability is that there is no 
democracy without democrats. Therefore it is a value in itself that a decision is made in 
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accordance with democratic principles and includes citizens directly in the process. The 
technical prerequisite here is public access to knowledge about civil service behavior 
and decisions and institutional arrangements suitable for participation. 
Ethical accountability implies that actions and decisions are accounted for with regards 
to general moral standards or specific professional ethics. Ethical standards are not 
fixed. Even though basic human rights are held high, the concrete interpretations hereof 
vary. The prerequisites for ethical accountability are, again, public access to knowledge 
about civil service behavior and decisions and relevant files and records. 
Regarding the five dimensions suggested by Wolf, it is easily illustrated that the 
„accountability problem“ is ill defined. What reasons for individual or organizational 
behavior will sate our quest for accountability? That rules were followed? That the 
money was spent most effectively? That it was in line with the overall policy goals? 
That it represented the views of the parties involved and stimulated their involvement 
and commitment? That it represented accepted and treasured values in society? What is 
it that we want decision-makers to account for? 
One answer could be 'everything – but in its proper place'. In this 'advanced technician's 
dream' we are dealing with a multi-facetted, but coherent system of accountabilities 
where each dimension of accountability applies to different relations and are irrelevant 
for others. Why don't we then just call in a consulting firm and get them to design a 
coherent and transparent system where the appropriate form of accountability can be 
evoked under the appropriate conditions? This is because reality intervenes. 
First, on the daily political scene (notably in a multi party, minority-coalition 
government system like the Danish), anybody can be held accountable for almost 
anything anytime as questions can be raised, often unexpectedly in one or several 
dimensions. Different forms of accountability are evoked under different circumstances 
by different actors: the public, the press, the Parliament, the Ombudsman, the Audit 
Office, the minister or private companies/voluntary associations competing with public 
sector bodies in a context of outsourcing. As giving accounts is inherently related to 
legitimacy, what counts is not if a certain account is technically correct, what counts is 
if it persuades the right people at the right time. However, it is not possible to prepare 
for all instances and produce readymade documentation for everything - just in case.  
Moreover, as outlined above - giving accounts in particular ways has specific technical 
prerequisites, need specific organization of information and institutionalization of 
accounting procedures in order to work. In order to judge if a decision was illegal, there 
needs to be legal documents, in order to judge if money was spent properly, there needs 
to be proper financial accounts and a standard of comparison etc. Developing 
accounting systems in practice is far from cost free. Therefore priorities become 
necessary. Finally, although there is no necessary conflict between the different 
dimensions of accountability it can easily be debated which one is the prime source of 
legitimacy and which ones are subordinate in case more than one can be evoked. (e.g., 
is it more important to treat refugees applying for asylum in an ethically defensible 
manner than it is to optimize the use of organizational resources - i.e., put the 
complicated cases in the bottom of the pile to meet the performance targets?). The 
preference for one dimension of accountability over others easily becomes a political 
game of its own. 
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In a situation where all dimensions of accountability can potentially be evoked; where 
attention is scarce but unpredictable; where development of accountability procedures, 
conventions and techniques must be prioritized and where there may be potential 
conflicts between the different dimensions of accountability, mobilizing attention and 
procedures around one solution to the accountability problem helps to grasp what is 
more and less important. (Lægreid and Roness, 1999). So, „(s)olutions and 
opportunities stimulate awareness of previously non-salient or unnoticed problems or 
preferences.“ (March and Olsen, 1989: 62) The solutions at hand help us to understand 
what the problem ‘really’ is. Hence, „…accounting does not represent reality – it creates 
it.“  
(Pallot, 1999). Further, 
 …although it is difficult to guess when an opportunity to attach a favorite 
solution to some problem will arise, a solution that is persistently available is 
likely to find an occasion… Any specific re-organization project is likely to fail, 
but persistent repetition of similar ideas and similar arguments over a relatively 
long period of time appears to make some difference. Bureaucratic reform seems 
to require long-run commitment, patience and perseverance. (March and Olsen, 
1989: 86)  
Consequently, „…governance becomes less a matter of engineering than of gardening, 
less a matter of hunting than of gathering“ (March and Olsen, 1989: 94). The conclusion 
is then, so far, first, that the accountability problem is likely to be defined in political 
games between actors with stakes in different perspectives on the public sector 
problems. Second, those actors who can master and organize a long-term commitment 
to certain solutions have the best chances of institutionalizing their preferred 
perspective. The question is then who keeps the „solution-pot“ on the stove. As pointed 
out above, it goes for the Danish case that „reorganization efforts have difficulty in 
sustaining the attention of major political actors „ (March and Olsen, 1989: 81). We, 
therefore, turn our attention to „the institutional gardener,“ i.e., the stake holders that, 
solidly, over a long time span create, broadcast and maintain specific types of 
accountability mechanisms - solutions - that subsequently help to frame our minds to 
discover and understand the basic nature of the governance problem.  
Problem-Solution: Keeping the Problem Pot on the Stove 
The Ministry of Finance has historically been a heavy weight ministry both because it 
plays what Aaron Wildavsky characterized as the „guardian“ role (see Kelly and Wanna 
in this  issue), and because Finance ministers are traditionally forceful individuals with 
considerable influence in government. Institutionally and politically, the Ministry of 
Finance has generally found it self close to the political core arena. However, in the late 
1970s – during the Social democratic government period, it lost terrain. The tension 
between a sound economy and low unemployment was solved in the favor of the latter. 
The prime minister's priorities went in the direction of the Minister of Labor, state debt 
was growing which led the minister of Finance to the above mentioned comments on 
„the abyss“. The Ministry of Finance found itself in a „humiliatingly weak position“ 
and the ministry was marked by „worry and frustration“ about the economic 
development (Østergaard, 1998: 292-3). The problem was for the ministry two-faced. 
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One face was the economic deficit the other was the organizational power decline. The 
strategy employed addressed both.  
Despite frustration, the ministry, among other things, began to develop a new budget 
system, inspired by the PUMA project „The Capacity to Budget“. The core ideas were 
frame budgets, - not line item budgets, effective incentive structures, simplifications and 
enhanced use of IT. „In and around the ministry of Finance there was a clear feeling that 
one was not dealing with a particularly Danish problem“ (Østergaard, 1998: 312) By 
1982 the government changed color and a coalition led by the Conservative party took 
office. Eventually, the seeds that were sown by the gardeners in the Ministry of Finance 
over the past couple of years got some ideological manure and were taken out in the 
open as 'the Modernization Program'. The Modernization Program was the first coherent 
administrative policy document (Østergaard, 1998:314):  
The political agenda expressed a changing paradigm. It became legitimate and 
interesting to talk about contracting out, markets and privatization. In the ministry 
of Finance years of frustration followed by and new self -confidence bordering on 
'Besserwissen' . The minister of Finance was also deputy Prime Minister and there 
was a feeling that anything the ministry ever wanted was now possible. 
(Østergaard, 1998: 313).  
However, as with most other broad policy programs, administrative politics proved a 
short run failure. In spite of the big noise - the „publicity boosting“ (Administrativ 
Debat, 1/87: 2), not a lot happened and the ideological hey-days came to an end quickly. 
Indeed, the government learnt the lesson that it was necessary to „…de-emphasize the 
political and ideological aspects of administrative reform.“ (March and Olsen 1989: 
102) For example, privatization caught ideological fire to the extent that the Prime 
Minister responded to a privatization report from the minister of Finance by slipping it 
down his desk drawer with the comment that „I am now doing you, our political party 
and the country a huge favor.“ (Qvortrup, 1999) However, the Ministry of Finance 
continued to work on the ideas of the 'Modernization program' under shifting 
ideological labels. Consequently, many of the ideas launched back in the early 1980s 
during the Conservatives have been implemented by the Social democrats during the 
1990s: 
 In the summer of 1993 the ministry of Finance published a report „Reinterpreting 
the public sector“. It was stressed that the quality of society and competition 
depended on a well-functioning public sector. The public sector was not the 
problem, but a part of the solution to the challenges facing Denmark. But the 
concrete initiatives for renewal of the public sector hardly differed from the 
previous activities. (Østergaard, 1998: 354) 
Some of the initiatives launched by the one government and carried out by the 
opposition encompass for example contract agencies (1992), enterprise accounting 
(1995), individualizing the pay system (1997) introducing performance contracts (1995) 
and selling out public assets (1994 -1997).  
The Conservative coalition government of the 1980s could be characterized by the 
Yorkshire expression of „all mouth and no trousers“ as far as the NPM reforms were 
concerned, whereas the current Social democratic coalition government is characterized 
by a lot of action, but less talk. This is not illogic. It is a case of short run failure – long 
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run success (March and Olsen, 1989: 87) and not of a particular party ideological 
program, but of an organizational strategy, where gardeners tender, adjust and articulate 
ideas continually for a longer period of time. So, the preoccupation with economic 
steering that solved the problems in the first place now helps to define the new problems 
to deal with. In a public lecture in September 1999 the permanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance remarked that, „The ministry has had two political 'scoops'…one, 
when the Conservatives wanted to show they could steer the economy in 1982 and two, 
when the Social democrats wanted to prove they could do this better than the 
Conservatives in 1993.“ To deliver solutions to the initial problem of acute economic 
deficits, the Ministry of Finance has managed to institutionalize a point of view in the 
mechanics of public sector accountability that not only produces solutions, but also 
frames the interpretation of the problems. The problem is no longer to overcome severe 
deficits but to avoid future problems: 
The fiscal consolidation process has gradually increased the general government 
surplus to 3 per cent of GDP in 1999. The main strategy behind the fiscal 
consolidation process has been to use the improvement in the public sector surplus 
caused by the interaction between automatic stabilizers and structural reform to 
reduce government debt. On top of this some net fiscal tightening has taken place, 
in particular in recent years. This has put government debt on a downward trend, 
which is to be continued for a long period in order to prepare for the aging 
population. Reducing public debt and thus interest payments has top priority 
compared to cutting taxes or increasing expenditures. (Danish Economy, 2000) 
Thus, the nature of the problem that the Conservative government faced in the early 
1980s has changed, and the current government prides itself of being in charge of the 
economy. Where this is indisputably good news, optimism also has its down sides seen 
from the ministry's point of view, since „…expenditure politics is impossible in 
Denmark, when everything goes too well.“ (Jensen, 2000: 47) The Ministry of Finance 
has a paradoxical interest in solving and re-inventing the economic ‘public sector 
problem’. In attempt to solve the initial problem, accountability mechanisms were 
institutionalized that – in the second round – serves to frame the interpretations of the 
potential future problems that we must already treat as „real“. Currently, the problem is 
constructed of three elements: the tax level, the demographic development and the state 
debt. 
Compared with other OECD countries Denmark has generally high tax level directly 
and indirectly and a steep progression in the tax system. (Ministry of Finance, 1998: 
article 12) . The tax base needs fundamental legitimacy. Lacking legitimacy in taxation 
leads to fiscal constraint. This lack of legitimacy is relatively easy to evoke politically. 
This is regularly done, if not by government, then by the opposition. On the other hand, 
the trust in government and the willingness to pay taxes is very high. (Ministry of 
Finance, 1999a: 24), so the constraint stemming from the tax burden has to be evoked. 
This is done by explicitly evoking the „taxpayer-identity“ within the public by stating 
that the public sector is spending taxpayer money and, therefore, the public service has a 
duty to spend it most effectively. (Ministry of Finance, 1999a) 
Second, in the coming years Denmark will have labor working and more children and 
elderly; fewer people will have to provide money for more. Rising service expectations 
in the public compounds this problem. The „new elderly“ grew up in the welfare state 
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and do not suffer from gratitude toward the public sector. This, in turn, creates pressure 
on public sector efficiency. 
Third, the need to pay off debt will be a major burden on our children if not paid off 
now. Fiscal accountability here achieves a moral/ethical dimension, resembling 
environmentalism, e.g., as captured by graffiti observed on Webb Street in Wellington, 
New Zealand, „We did not inherit the world from our ancestors, we borrowed it from 
our children.“ This perspective makes us accountable beyond the current population, the 
current electorates and service users.  
These future problem elements are already seen as „real“ in the sense that solutions are 
designed to cope with them even better than we have already done. In one sense it is 
always possible to do better and this becomes and argument in its own right, because if 
we know how to do things more effectively, what is then the argument for not doing it? 
So mechanisms of fiscal accountability help us to grasp the problem: Because 
accounting for economic performance is possible we start to ask why people or 
organizations are not performing even better. Because comparative techniques are 
available, we start to ask why some are performing less efficiently than others are. And 
we want them to account for the difference.  
Institutionalization of fiscal Accountability empowers the Ministry of Finance  
Referring to the point about late modern governance as permanently "wicked,“ the 
observation was made that in a system of increasing governance complexity, no one 
actor, individual or collective can rest in a position of power on the top of „the 
hierarchy“- because there is no one hierarchy: 
In the OECD world, the unilateral exercise of state authority is internally limited 
by the fragmentation of political power and by the success of the deregulation 
movement, and it is externally constrained by the rise of transnational economic 
and ecological interdependence, which, even in Western Europe, far exceeds the 
slow progress toward more effective supranational policy coordination. (Scharpf, 
1993:125) 
Any actor, even the ones that are by convention and folk wisdom seen as most 
powerful, must continually re-install, re-invent, re-new their capacity to remain central 
in the game-traffic of late modern governance systems (Jensen, 2000). Different 
organization analysis have competing analytical points of departure (see for example 
Morgan, 1988), but the variety of interpretations is beyond the scope of this article. (See 
Jensen, 2000). I therefore follow the conventional assumption that most organizations 
find themselves as more or less open entities in an environment in which they seek to 
survive (Morgan, 1988: 72). In the case of Finance ministries, the theoretical point of 
organizational „survival“ should not be taken too literally. It is unlikely to run a modern 
state without a Finance ministry. Finance ministries throughout the world vary in 
structure, competence, power, history and culture, but unlike many other ministries they 
don't suffer from an ever-present threat of being abandoned. However, their actual 
influence on the economic situation, the political scene and administrative system must 
continually be fought for. As the current minister of Finance expresses it in the 
foreword of the 150th anniversary publication (Østergaard, 1998:4), "As long as the 
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Danish state has existed, somebody has had keep the finances together. This has 
indisputably been done with varying success."  
Although invariably seen as a prestigious „top ministry“, the position of the Ministry of 
Finance is continually fought for – and regularly won - in recurring games with the 
environment. In a complex environment with no hierarchy set in stone, organizational 
„survival“ entails continual management of relations to other actors. In these relations 
the Ministry of Finance strives to maximize influence on the relevant environment and 
minimize foreign influence on itself. Maximizing influence on the relevant environment 
can be done either by controlling the specific decisions in that environment or by 
deciding the premises on which decisions in the environment are reached or agreement 
between the Ministry of Finance itself and the other actors are made. Given the sheer 
scale of public sector activity, the amount of decisions made and the fluid 
interdependence of multiple relations, the first option is not permanently realistic or 
economic for any actor. As important as winning a game towards other actors in the 
sense of making them decide what you want them to decide, is the capacity to play the 
next game as well, preferably even better. Preserving and developing the gaming 
capacity becomes an important criterion for organizational „survival“.  
In this light public sector reforms may help the Ministry of Finance to create and 
institutionalize a set of overarching principles that other actors have to consult and 
comply with when they make all their individual decisions in a diversity of areas. If it 
succeeds it gets to play the role of ' the central bank ' issuing the communal currency 
with which all actors must trade: "There are two general media of communication 
across ministries. One is legality – another is money." (Interview with a senior 
executive in the Ministry of Finance, January, 2000) 
Reforms that build on fiscal accountability as a value and as institutionalized 
mechanisms enhance the position of the ministry of Finance ideologically, 
organizationally and politically. Ideologically they help to frame the mind of citizens 
and decision-makers that „first wee look at the money, then we look at the rest.“ The 
ideological impact of public sector out of the Ministry of Finance has been a vigorously 
debated issue in the Danish academia and press over the past 2 to3 years. Fiscal 
accountability is seen as, „becoming a mantra“ because the whole of the public sector is 
absorbed in counting and accounting for their use of public funds and their own 
performance. (Jensen, 2000) The critics' assumption is summarized neatly by Gregory's 
(2000) catchphrase, "If it can't be counted, it does not count.“  
Organizationally, public sector reforms have enabled the ministry to „bureau shape“ in 
Dunleavy's (1991) use of the term as it has off loaded numerous of its initial control 
functions to agencies or other institutions and institutionalized mechanisms by which 
the former controlled are now controlling themselves within broad budget frames for 
each ministry. The aim of this exercise was to get rid of „dead flesh“ to get „closer to 
the political hurricane center“ so, „there is a truth in the saying that small is 
beautiful.“(Eldrup, 1994) The dictum of the functionalist architect, Mies van der Rohe: 
„less is more“ seems to capture the organizational strategy of the ministry. Free from its 
„dead flesh“ the „shaped bureau“ is thus investing its organizational resources in 
broader structural/economical analysis (tax systems, pension systems, labor market, 
education systems) on the back of which it enables itself to substantially coordinate 
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policy initiatives for the government as a whole. As stated by the Permanent Secretary 
of Finance, the idea is that the ministry of Finance is: 
(n)o longer waiting for the other ministries coming to us with their propositions. 
The ministry of Finance…must be able to predict problem areas and regularly 
take the first initiative, so that the Finance minister sets the scene…from being a 
brake block were are becoming the initiators. (Østergaard,1998: 350) 
This – in turn – means a substantial political empowerment of the ministry, not in the 
sense of controlling specific political decisions (although there are such examples), but 
more in the way of framing the political agenda. Whether, how and to what extent this 
is in itself a democratic problem is a separate debate beyond the scope of this article. 
(See Jensen, 2000)  
Conclusions 
Complex, multilevel governance systems with many players are a fact of life in late 
modernity, a fact that only by a considerable stretch of imagination fits the normative 
idea of a transparently controllable bureaucracy, i.e., one that gives meaning to the 
parliamentary chain of governance. The gap between the need to control and an 
uncontrollable system is continually being bridged by institutionalizing different types 
of accountability that - by the same token - serve to enhance the position of certain 
players over others in a continual political-administrative power game. 
The debate on NPM-inspired public sector reforms tends to separate into two distinct 
debate communities: a normative community, where it is debated whether reforms are 
„good“ or not, and a technical one where it is debated whether reforms are „smart“ or 
not. It is argued that we get reforms because they represent better values (such as 
legitimacy, accountability, parsimony, etc.) or because they enable "getting the job 
done" in a technically smarter way. We should, however, not jump to the conclusion 
that the reason why we get the reforms is that they are „better“ or „smarter“. We should 
consider that the reasons given for reforms are relevant, but not preemptive; we should 
see public sector reforms though the spectacles of Nietzsche's (1987: 77) observation 
that: 
 …the cause of origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and 
place in a system of purpose lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow 
come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, 
transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it.  
We should, therefore, also look at how public sector reforms are adopted or rejected, 
reinterpreted or accommodated to political strategies within the specific systems where 
they take place. The construction of fiscal accountability as a prime source of 
governmental legitimacy is highly in the interest of the Ministry of Finance, not only 
because good arguments can be brought to bear, and not only because it is always 
necessary to develop new steering techniques to control how public money is spent. 
Both the normative and the technical takes on the debate are relevant. But, it is also 
necessary to recognize that the normative plea for fiscal accountability as a cornerstone 
in democratic governance, and the preoccupation with institutionalizing economic 
steering techniques also place the Ministry of Finance in the center of the political 
game, and this position is always actively fought for in it own right.  
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